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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* 
BOBBIE C. DICKINSON, 
* 
Plaintiff - Appellant, 
* 
vs. 
* 
SHERRIL COTTRELL DICKINSON, 
nka SHERRIL HENRIE, * 
Defendant - Respondent * 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal 
pursuant to UCA §78-2a-3 (2 ) (g) . 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Following a decree of divorce between the parties 
hereto, Plaintiff petitioned the District Court to modify the 
decree of divorce so as to relieve him from the obligation to 
satisfy a second real estate mortgage owing against the 
residence of the parties which had beeii awarded in full to 
Defendant. The District Court denied the petition, finding no 
substantial change in material circumstances. Plaintiff appeals 
the order denying his petition. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The broad issue which is presented for review is 
whether the District Court erred in failing to find a sufficient 
change of circumstances so as to justify a modification of the 
decree of divorce. Central to that general issue, Plaintiff 
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asserts that (a) the Court erred in failing to find that his 
annual income had decreased substantially, and (b) in failing 
to find that Defendants income had increased due to her 
receipt of rental income from the home which she was awarded by 
the decree of divorce. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
This appeal does not call for any review or analysis 
of constitutional provisions, ordinances or other rules. 
However, the provisions of UCA §30-3-5, do provide broad 
statutory guidance. Subsection (3) of that statute reads as 
followings: 
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for 
the support and maintenance of the parties, 
the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health, and dental 
care, or the distribution of the property as 
is reasonable and necessary. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal presents issues which arose between the 
parties after a decree of divorce in the District Court. The 
case was tried on October 30, 1985 and a decree followed. 
During a number of post-decree hearings, the parties litigated 
issues of (a) child custody, (b) termination of alimony, (c) 
claims for post-decree attorneyTs fees, and (d) whether 
Plaintiff should be relieved from the obligation to pay a 
second real estate mortgage owing to lions First National Bank 
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which encumbered the home property that was awarded to 
Defendant in the original decree. Heatings were conducted by 
the Court on September 10, 1986, May 13, 1987, and May 27, 1987, 
to accomplish the foregoing. The only issue which survives 
those prolonged proceedings is that sufrounding Plaintifffs 
obligation to satisfy the real estate Mortgage to Zions First 
National Bank. The District Court denied relief to the 
Plaintiff in that regard, finding an insufficient change in the 
circumstances of the parties. Plaintiff appeals that decision, 
with no cross appeal being pursued by Defendant. 
IDENTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPTS 
Four transcripts are included with the record on 
appeal. One transcript reports the original trial proceeding, 
and the other three transcripts report the three post-trial 
evidentuary hearings. To assist the Court, the trial 
transcript will be referred to as the usual MTR" designation, 
and the other transcripts will be referred to by ffTM followed 
by the date of the hearing. For example, the transcript which 
reports the May 27, 1987 hearing will tye designated as "T 
27May87M. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The decree of divorce between these parties addressed 
issues of (a) division of personal property, (b) award of 
residence, and (c) two real estate mortgages owing against the 
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residence. Certain firewood was divided evenly between the 
parties without any designation of value (Record 33). The 
balance of the personal property was divided between the 
parties pursuant to a proposed division submitted by Plaintiff 
(Record 32 and 33). Other than the firewood, the various 
values of the personal property was set forth in Exhibits 2 and 
5 which were received by the Court (TR 4). Plaintiff offered 
testimony in confirmation of those values (TR 26 and 27). The 
value of the home was placed at $55,000.00 (Exhibit 2), and 
that value was acknowledged by Defendant (T 44 13May87). Those 
values were never disputed. Defendant was ordered to assume 
the first real estate mortgage owing against the residence to 
Farmers Home Administration in the approximate sum of 
$18,500.00 (Record 32), and Plaintiff as ordered to assume the 
second real estate mortgage owing on the home to Zions First 
National Bank in the approximate sum of $18,000.00 (Record 
33). Defendant was awarded the home itself, Plaintiff not 
receiving any interest therein (Record 32). 
The decree of divorce then results in a property 
division as follows: 
To The Plaintiff To The Defendant 
Personal property $4,850.00 Personal Property $ 8,750.00 
Residence 55,000.00 
TOTAL . . . . . . $4,850.00 
TOTAL $63,750.00 
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Defendant's obligation to assume the mortgage to 
Farmers Home Administration would reduce the value of her 
property in the amount of the mortgage, $18,500.00, such that 
the value of the property received by her would then be 
$45,250.00. Plaintiff's obligation to pay the second mortgage 
to Zions First National Bank would place the value of the 
property awarded to him at the negative figure of -$13,150.00. 
The Court found Plaintiff's earnings at $25,000.00 per year, 
and the earnings of Defendant at $2,100.00 per year (Record 27). 
Plaintiff's child support obligation wgs fixed at $300.00 per 
month for two of the children, and his alimony obligation to 
Defendant was set at $300.00 per month for a period of twenty-
four months (Record 27). 
After the Dickinsons had divorced, Wallace K. Henrie 
and Gloria Henrie obtained a divorce from one another, and Mr. 
Dickinson married the prior Mrs. Henrie (Gloria), and Mr. 
Henrie married the prior Mrs. Dickinson (Sherril) (T 10 and 11 
27May87). 
Mr. Henrie was a seven year employee of Zions First 
National Bank (TR 11 and 12 27May87), and had gross income for 
the year of 1986 of $28,438.29 (TR 12 and 13 27May87). 
Defendant's income for 1986 was a gross of $2,728.62 from wages 
(TR 13 27May87), but that income did not reflect child support 
income nor income from rents on the home which she was awarded 
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in the divorce. Following Defendants marriage to Mr. Henrie, 
she moved into his home in Richfield, and placed tenants in the 
Glenwood home, the residence which she was awarded in the 
Dickinson divorce (T 29 27May87). Those tenants commenced 
occupancy in June of 1986 and made monthly rental payments of 
$260.00 each under a two year contract (T 30 27May87). 
Defendant continued to pay the monthly installment on the 
mortgage to Farmers Home Administration of $162.00 (T 31 
27May87). 
Plaintiff's present wife (the prior Mrs. Henrie) was 
employed at the time of the May 27, 1987 hearing with net 
monthly earnings of $850.00 (T 39 27May87). Plaintiff's gross 
income for 1986 was $17,333.92 (T 18 27May87), and he had no 
other sources of income (T 19 27May87). Plaintiff's income of 
$25,000.00 per year which was found by the Court at the time of 
the decree had resulted in bonuses or commissions which he had 
earned in addition to his ordinary wage (T 17 and 18 27May87). 
On March 18, 1987, Michael Henrie, who resided in the 
Dickinson household, turned eighteen years of age which 
terminated Mr. Henrie's support obligation of $165.00 per month 
to the then present Mrs. Dickinson (T 46 13May87). Michael was 
a senior in high school at that time (T 47 13May87). Mr. 
Dickinson continued to support Michael as a member of his house-
hold (T 58 13May87). 
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By the time of the May, 1987 hearing, the Dickinsons 
had overspent their income for the previous year by 
approximately $3,000.00 (T 48 13May87)(See details in Exhibit 8 
received at the May 13, 1987 hearing). That deficit was 
financed by the Dickinsons by use of a credit card (T 54 
13May87). 
Plaintiff then argued the following changes in 
circumstances to support his petition (JRecord 164 - 167): 
a. Defendant was remarried and was supported by 
her present husband who had gainful employment at Zions First 
National Bank with annual earnings in excess of $28,000.00. 
b. Defendant personally had an income increase 
from $2,100.00 as found by the Court atl the time of the decree 
to the sum of $2,728.62 for the calendar year of 1986. 
c. Defendant had let the Glenwood home to 
tenants at a monthly rental of $260.00, for an annual income 
increase of $3,120.00. 
d. Plaintiff's income had decreased from 
$25,000.00 in 1985 to $17,333.92 in 1986. 
e. Child support of $165.00 per month to the 
Dickinson household for Michael Henrie had terminated, although 
Plaintiff continued to have the actual support obligation for 
that child who was at the time a senior in high school. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Court erred in finding that Plaintiff!s income had 
not decreased. Plaintiff had income of $25,000.00 for the year 
of 1985, but because of the absence of bonuses and commissions 
during 1986, his income decreased to $17,333.92, a difference 
of approximately $8,000.00. Plaintiff testified as to that 
amount of income, and offered tax returns and other records in 
verification. Defendant offered nothing to controvert that 
evidence and the finding of the Court that Plaintifffs income 
had not decreased was totally lacking in any evidentuary basis. 
Defendant's income had increased because of her rental 
of the Glenwood home, a positive cash flow of $3,120.00 per 
year, but the Court erred in not giving that increase in income 
the weight and significance to which it was entitled. The 
Court viewed the existence of maintenance, insurance and 
property taxes as offsetting that income, but failed to realize 
that those expenses existed before the placing of tenants in the 
home. 
The remarriage of Defendant, the decrease in 
Plaintiff's income, the increase in Defendant's income, and 
Plaintiff's continued support of Michael Henrie after he turned 
eighteen years of age, combined to show significant changes in 
the circumstances of the parties as to warrant the relief 
requested by Plaintiff, and the Court committed error in 
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faiilng to find a material change of circumstances. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I -- THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
FAILING TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF'S INCOME 
HAD DECREASED BY $8,000,00 
At the time of the divorce trial the Plaintiff had 
wage income combined with bonus and commission income which 
totalled approximately $25,000.00, and the trial Court 
correctly found that to be his annual Earnings. Plaintiff 
testified that the year in question, 1985, was a good year for 
his employment and that he had a numbeir of commission jobs. 
However, the year of 1986 had not prodi^ ced any commission jobs, 
and he was relegated to his fixed wage which produced a gross 
of $17,333.92. That figure was verified by Plaintiff's 1986 
W-2 tax statement. Defendant did not 0ffer any evidence to 
controvert the testimony and documents which Plaintiff had 
offered to show his 1986 income. Defendant did acknowledge 
that she could have subpoenaed Plaintiff's employment records, 
his bank records, take his deposition, or produce his tax 
records, but that she had not done so (T 36 and 37 27May87). 
In the face of foregoing, the trial Court refused to 
find that Plaintiff's income had decreased (T 55 27May87). The 
court justified that conclusion by stating that Plaintiff had 
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income in 1985 which was in addition to his W-2 statement 
income, without any explanation as to how that would impact 
income for 1986. In other words, the trial Court relied upon 
evidence received at the time of the divorce trial (October 30, 
1985) and totally ignored the absence of any evidence to 
discredit the testimony and documentary evidence which Plaintiff 
offered to support his claim at the May, 1987 hearings. The 
f!clearly erroneous" standard is met when there is nothing in 
the evidence to support the finding in question. 
POINT II -- THE COURT, ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO 
FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S INCOME HAD INCREASED BY 
$3,120.00 PER YEAR AS A RESULT OF RENTALS 
RECEIVED FROM THE GLENWOOD HOME 
At the time of the divorce of the parties the Defendant 
was residing in the Glenwood home. She was awarded that asset 
in full. She then married Mr. Henrie, moved to his home in 
Richfield, and placed tenants in possession of the Glenwood 
home at a rental of $260.00 per month. The lease began in June 
of 1986, and would run for a period of two years. Defendant 
had the obligation to pay insurance and taxes for the Glenwood 
home, and would have had ordinary maintenance expenses. Those 
items exist independent of a letting of the home to tenants. 
Defendant had those obligations when she resided in the home, 
and they continued after she ceased to reside at that residence. 
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The cash flow result is obvious. Her annual income increased 
by the sum of $3,120.00. Despite that obvious cash flow change 
for the better, the Court found that Defendant was not receiving 
any Appreciable disposable cash." (Record 171) 
POINT III -- THE COURT ERRED N^ FAILING TO FIND 
A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUM$TANCES SO AS TO 
JUSTIFY A MODIFICATION C|F THE DECREE 
Plaintiff's income from 1985 tio 1986 had decreased by 
$7,667.00, primarily because he was unable to secure any 
commission or bonus projects. Defendant's income had increased 
$3,120.00 as a result of rentals received by her from the 
Glenwood home. In addition, her wage had increased from 
$2,100.00 in 1985 to $2,728.00 in 1986, the difference being 
$628.00. Defendant had remarried with |her present husband 
earning $28,000.00 per year. Plaintiff had remarried and his 
current spouse was earning approximately $12,000.00 gross per 
year. Michael Henrie who was supported by the Dickinson 
household turned eighteen on March 18, 1987, resulting in a 
monthly decrease of income to the Dickihson household of 
$165.00. Furthermore, the mortgage debt owing to Zions First 
National Bank had been refinanced so as to reduce the monthly 
installments from $399.00 per month to $218.00 per month, the 
latter figure being less the rental income which Defendant was 
realizing from her tenants. 
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UCA §30-3-5 grants continuing jurisdiction for 
subsequent changes with reference to distribution of property, 
or with reference to support orders, among other matters. 
Changes in relative incomes will justify the termination of 
alimony, Haslam v. Haslam, Utah 657 P.2d 757 (1982). Even in 
the face of a stipulated waiver of alimony, a change in cir-
cumstances will justify the modification of a decree so as to 
impose upon one party the obligation to pay alimony to the 
other, Kinsman v. Kinsman, Utah 73 UAR 110 (January 12, 1988). 
A stipulated property settlement is likewise subject to 
modification, but would require compelling reasons to do so, 
Land v. Land, Utah 605 P.2d 1248 (1980). Although greater 
restraint is imposed in modifying a property distribution when 
compared with changes in continuing child and spousal support 
orders, divorce Court directives for one party to assume and 
satisfy a particular debt and hold the other party harmless are 
often times viewed as in the nature of spousal support versus 
property settlement and distribution, Holt v. Holt, Utah 672 
P.2d 738 (1983); Beckmann v. Beckmann, Utah 685 P.2d 1045 
(1984); Erickson v. Verardall, Utah 437 P.2d 210 (1968). In 
the instant matter, the burden to satisfy the mortgage to Zions 
First National Bank, or relief from that burden, would directly 
bear upon the income and expenses of the parties, and 
consequently their support. The real test should turn upon 
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income resources when compared with income needs. The whole 
picture is either nmoney in" or "money out" and a labeling of 
cash flow as support or property does not automatically solve 
the difficult questions which are presented by cases of this 
nature. Thus, Plaintiff contends that the mortgage obligation 
should be treated in the context of spdusal support and 
adjudicated by a less rigorous standard than would apply to a 
true property division situation. 
Even if we are to view the dedreed obligation for 
Plaintiff to assume and satisfy the Zions First National Bank 
mortgage as strictly a property settlement, the facts of the 
instant matter justify and warrant a finding that there have 
been substantial changes in the circumstances of the parties. 
Facts of less magnitude have been foundl to be ample, Teece v. 
Teece, Utah 715 P.2d 106 (1986). In a case of near parallel 
facts to the instant matter the Utah Supreme Court observed 
that the moving party had presented a prima facie case of 
changed circumstances, Chandler v. West, Utah 610 P.2d 1299 
(1980). In Chandler, the parties had divorced pursuant to a 
written stipulation which provided for an award of the parties 
home to the Plaintiff (wife). The home was valued at 
$46,000.00, and the Defendant (husband) was ordered to make all 
mortgage payments on the premises. The mortgage indebtedness 
was less than $14,000.00. The husband in Chandler was also 
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ordered to pay alimony of $300.00 per month. The decree was 
dated February 9, 1977. In July of that year the wife sold the 
home for $60,000.00 and remarried within weeks of the sale of 
the home. The husband then terminated mortgage payments and 
order to show cause proceedings then litigated the issue. The 
husband claimed that the remarriage of the wife and her sale of 
the home constituted a material change of circumstances so as 
to justify a modification of the decree to relieve him from the 
obligation to retire the mortgage. The District Court viewed 
the obligation on the part of husband to pay the mortgage part 
of the property settlement between the parties and ordered 
husband to continue making payments. On appeal the Utah 
Supreme Court observed that property settlements nare entitled 
to a greater sanctity than alimony and support payments" but 
stated that they are not sacrosanct nor beyond the equitable 
power of the Court to modify. The court in Chandler also 
correctly observed that the order to pay the mortgage 
obligation was not a typical property distribution matter, 
viewing it in a class by itself. At page 1300 of the Chandler 
opinion, the Court stated: 
Clearly it was within the power of the trial 
Court to modify or eliminate the obligation to 
make those payments if the obviously changed 
circumstances under traditional equity 
standards so require. 
The Court then remanded the case because of the 
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absence of needed findings of fact, but commented that husband 
had presented "a prima facie case of changed circumstances 
which basically raises a serious questions as to fairness and 
equity of continuing the financial obligations of one party...?f 
In the case at bar, the unfairtness of the situation is 
crystalized when the original decree i$ used as a starting 
point. Defendant came out of the marrilage with assets having a 
total value of $63,750.00, subject to a| mortgage obligation of 
$18,500.00. Plaintiff came out of the Imarriage with assets 
totalling $4,850.00, and a mortgage obligation of $18,000.00. 
In the face of that great disparity, Pl|aintifffs income has 
decreased substantially, whereas Defendant has had some 
increase to her income. Furthermore, Defendant's rental income 
from the home is ample to meet the continuing mortgage payments, 
whereas Plaintiff is unable to meet his continuing monthly 
expenses based upon his reduced income. Even when the income 
of his current wife is brought into the picture. 
A final comment is needed regatding the continued 
support by Plaintiff of Michael Henrie, the eighteen year old 
teenager, who resides in his home. It is proper to consider 
that fact. Obligations for a nnew family" or a stepchild are 
relevant in resolving issues of the type presented by this 
appeal, Openshaw v. Openshaw, Utah 639 FT • 2d 177 (1981). 
Michael Henrie had continuing support n^eds, and the reaching 
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of his eighteenth birthday in March of 1987 did not alter those 
needs. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff made a prima facie showing of a substantial 
change in the circumstances of the parties, and the court erred 
in failing to so find. The Court should reinstate Plaintifffs 
petition and remand the matter to the District Court for the 
purpose of considering appropriate modifications to the decree. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 1988. 
LABRUM & TAYLOR 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT} GF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOBBIE C. DICKINSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHERRIL COTTRELL DICKINSON, 
nka SHERRIL HENRIE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
IN RE PETITION TO MODIFY 
Civil Nb. 9602 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the 27th 
day of May, 1987, on the Plaintiff's petition for modification, 
and the Court having heard the evidence adduced, and counsel 
having stipulated that the Court could consider evidence previ-
ously introduced herein, and particularly evidence introduced at 
a hearing held on May 13, 1987, and having heard the arguments of 
counsel and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the 
following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff's obligation to fpay a certain debt at 
Zions First National Bank secured by a second mortgage on a home 
2 
in Glenwood, Utah, awarded to Defendant was part and parcel of 
the* ^ overall -property - settlement, which the Court decreed at the 
time of granting the divorce herein, and was not by way of 
support payment to Defendant. 
2. At the time of entry of the original decree 
herein, Plaintiff was ordered to pay to Defendant the sum of 
$300.00 per month child support for two children, the sum of 
$3 00.00 per month alimony, together with the payment required to 
retire the debt at Zions First National B^nk. 
3. That by virtue of Defendant's remarriage, Plain-
tiff's alimony obligation of $300.00 per nonth has been termin-
ated. 
4. That Defendant renegotiated the debt at Zions 
Bank, which has inured to the benefit of Plaintiff, and his 
monthly obligation has been reduced from $399.00 per month to 
some $218.00 per month. 
5. That Defendant has remarried, and is now supported 
by her present husband, who has a gross annual earning capacity 
of some $28,438.00. 
6. That Plaintiff has remarried, and his present wife 
has a gross annual earning capacity of $12,000.00. 
7. That Plaintiff's reportable income, as evidenced 
by withholding statements supplied by hi$ employer, has at all 
material times been approximately $17,000.00. The evidence 
initially submitted to this Court by Plaintiff at the time of the 
original divorce hearing indicated an estimated 1985 income of 
3 
$16,894.88. Plaintiff's reportable income for the year 1986 was 
$17,333. .92. 
8. At the time of the original divorce hearing, 
Plaintiff admitted that he had received cash payments from his 
employer beyond what was reflected in the exhibits he had 
introduced, and based thereon the Court found that Defendant had 
a gross earning capacity of $25,000.00 annually. Plaintiff 
continues to work for the same employer, and the Court has not 
been convinced that there has been any substantial change in 
Plaintiff's earning capacity. 
9. During the year 1986, Plaintiff and his present 
wife had net disposable income of some $34,539.00. 
10. That since entry of the decree herein, Defendant's 
income has increased in a modest amount from $2,100.00 to some 
$2,728.00. 
11. That subsequent to the entry of the original 
decree of divorce, Plaintiff married one Gloria Henrie, whose 
former husband thereafter married the Defendant herein, resulting 
in Plaintiff paying child support to Defendant while at the same 
time Plaintiff's present wife received child support from 
Defendant's present husband. 
12. That until April of 1987, Plaintiff's present wife 
received child support from her former husband of $165.00 per 
month for each of three children for a totial of $495.00. At the 
same time, Plaintiff paid to his former wife the sum of $150.00 
per month per child for two children for a total of $300.00. In 
4 
April of this year, Plaintifffs wifefs oldest child attained 
majority, and, accordingly, she now receives payment for two 
children at the rate of $165.00 each, for a total of $330.00. At 
the same time, Plaintiff continues to pay out for two children 
the sum of $300.00. 
13. At the time of the entry ct>f the original divorce 
decree, Defendant occupied the home awarded to her and had the 
use and benefit thereof. Upon her remarrilage, she has rented the 
home and receives therefrom the sum <£>f $262.00 per -month. 
However, she remains obliged to satisfy the first mortgage and to 
pay taxes, insurance and upkeep, the coitnbined monthly cost of 
which approximates the rental payment received, so that it 
provides no appreciable disposable cash. 
14. Each party should bear his/her own costs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff has failed to prove a sufficient material 
change of circumstances to warrant thi? Court upsetting the 
property settlement originally decreed. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILINq 
I hereby* certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN RE PETITION 
TO MODIFY was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, 
Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid on the 
r^U^y day of June, 1987, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Marcus Ttaylor 
P. 0. Box 724 
Richfield, qtah 84701 
mdi fe/ffW//. 
KAY L. McIFF 
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
151 North Main Street 
P. 0. Box 605 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 801 896-5441 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOBBIE C. DICKINSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHERRIL COTTRELL DICKINSON, 
nka SHERRIL HENRIE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
TO MODIFY DECREE 
Civil N<^ . 9602 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the 
petition of the Plaintiff to modify the deqree of divorce herein, 
and the matter having come before the CoUrt for hearing on May 
27, 1987, and the court having heard the Evidence and arguments, 
and having entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
being fully advised in the premises, orders as follows,to-wit: 
Plaintiffs petition to modify the decree is hereby 
denied, and it shall remain in force and effect as originally 
entered. 
DATED this / day of Ju^ fe^  jMy, 1987. 
$ 
d 
:\ 
2 
DICKINSON VS. DICKINSON 
CIVIL NO. 9602 
ORDER DENYING PETITION TO 
MODIFY DECREE (CONT.) 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE 
was placed in the United States mail at, Richfield, Utah, with 
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid^ on the rP-t^f day of 
June, 1987, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Marcus Taylor 
P. 0. Box 724 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
MARCUS TAYLOR (3203) 
LABRUM § TAYLOR 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
108 NORTH MAIN STREET 
P.O. BOX 724 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
(801)896-6484 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOBBIE C. DICKINSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SHERRIL COTTRELL DICKINSON, 
nka SHERRIL HENRIE, 
Defendant/Respondent. * 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 9602 
Bobbie C. Dickinson, the Plaintiff/Appellant named aboved, by and 
through his counsel, Marcus Taylor, hereby gives notice of his appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals from that certain Order Denying Petition to Modify 
Decree made and entered by the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sevier County, 
said order bearing date of July 1, 1987, and having been entered by the Clerk 
of the Court on the date of July 7, 1987. 
DATED this 31st day of July, 1987. 
LABRUM § TAYLOR 
MARCUS TAYLOR 
Notice of Appeal 
Dickinson vs. Dickinson 
Civil No. 9602 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I herewith and hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEAL was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with 
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, this j j / 4 ^ day of July, 1987, 
addressed as follows: 
Kay L. Mclff, Esq. 
OLSEN, McIFF § CHAMBERLAIN 
151 North Main 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Secretary ft 
